Contradictions Between Islam and Realpolitik: Understanding Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations

Key points:

1. The Durand Line dispute remains the core historical cause of mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
2. Pakistan’s Afghan policy is contradictory, and lacks any consistency leading to misinterpretation.
3. Cross-border militancy (e.g., TTP sanctuaries) fuels mutual accusations and insecurity.
4. Afghanistan’s policy toward Pakistan is reactionary, often using anti-Pakistan sentiment for internal and regional leverage.
5. Refugees and trade have been used as political tools by both sides.
6. Both states act under realpolitik, not Islamic principles of justice and honesty.
7. Islamic ethics reject deceit and foul play in politics, creating a moral contradiction in both countries’ conduct.
8. Stability requires joint border management, counterterrorism cooperation, and domestic reform.
9. Lasting peace demands aligning policy with Islamic moral values and moving beyond zero-sum politics.

Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a border, a people, and a century of tangled politics. Their relationship has been shaped by colonial legacies, competing security priorities, and chronic mistrust. Both states claim victimhood while pursuing policies that often reproduce the very instability they denounce. This article outlines those contradictions with evidence and offers an honest appraisal of why the cycle persists.

Analysis

The Durand Line is the oldest political fault line between the two countries. Drawn in 1893 by the British, it was never fully accepted by successive Afghan governments. Pakistan treats the line as a settled international border, while Afghan elites and many Pashtun nationalists view it as a colonial imposition that divides one people. In practice, the disputed border has allowed cross-border flows of people, arms, and ideas that both states exploit and fear. Recent spikes in cross-border clashes and renewed claims over the line underscore how historical grievance continues to influence contemporary politics.

Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy has long been marked by contradictory aims. Islamabad has sought a friendly Kabul to secure its western flank, to counter Indian influence, and to keep Pashtun nationalism in check. To achieve those aims, Pakistan has at times supported armed groups inside Afghanistan or favored factions that could deliver a pliant government.

The most consequential period was the 1980s and 1990s when Pakistani intelligence played an active role in supporting mujahideen fighters against the Soviet occupation and later sought to shape post-1992 outcomes. That policy yielded short-term leverage but also empowered non-state actors and fractured Afghan politics. Various reports and academic studies have documented how such policies produced long-term instability and extremist blowback within Pakistan itself.

Pakistan faces real domestic security threats emanating from Afghan soil. Groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have used sanctuaries across the border to regroup and strike inside Pakistan. Islamabad, therefore, pressures Kabul to act against those groups. From Pakistan’s perspective, this is a legitimate demand. However, Afghan authorities often accuse Pakistan of exaggerating threats to justify interference. These mutual suspicions frequently lead to diplomatic rows and border skirmishes, undermining regional security.

Afghanistan’s policy toward Pakistan has its own problematic features. Kabul has historically accused Islamabad of meddling in its internal affairs, yet Afghan elites have at times harbored Pakistani opposition figures or provided political cover to groups hostile to Pakistan. During the 1980s, Afghanistan’s intelligence agencies were accused of supporting separatist movements inside Pakistan. In later years, Afghan politics has occasionally used anti-Pakistan sentiment to extract concessions from Islamabad or to gain favor with India and Western powers.

The pattern is asymmetric. Afghanistan lacks the depth of state power that Pakistan has, but its tolerance of anti-Pakistan elements increases insecurity on both sides. Such actions invite retaliatory measures, border closures, and military responses that ultimately harm civilians rather than policymakers.

Both states have also instrumentalized refugees and trade for political ends. Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees since 1979. At times, Islamabad has welcomed them as a humanitarian necessity and as a demographic buffer. At other times, Pakistan has used refugee policies as political leverage, tightening registration or threatening mass expulsions during diplomatic tensions. Human rights organizations have warned that such measures endanger refugees, particularly under Taliban rule. This oscillation deepens Afghan mistrust of Pakistani intentions and fuels the perception that humanitarian issues are tools of statecraft rather than genuine moral commitments.

Here lies a central contradiction. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan claim to be Islamic republics guided by moral values. Yet their political conduct has often mirrored the realpolitik of secular states, driven by power calculations rather than ethical standards. Islam emphasizes justice (adl), trust (amanah), and truthfulness (sidq), which apply equally to individuals and states. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) declared that deceit and betrayal have no place even in diplomacy or governance.

When analysts justify a policy on the grounds that “all states act this way,” they are invoking a realist paradigm, not an Islamic one. Such justification may explain behavior in international relations but cannot sanctify it within Islamic ethics. To align statecraft with Islamic values, policies must be transparent, just, and oriented toward peace rather than manipulation.

Several structural realities make the Pakistan–Afghanistan relationship difficult to stabilize. Geography and ethnicity intertwine their fates. The porous border and cross-cutting Pashtun tribal links make it impossible to separate domestic from foreign politics. Asymmetric capabilities further complicate matters—Pakistan’s greater state capacity allows it to project influence, but it also breeds resentment in Kabul. Meanwhile, external actors such as India, Iran, Russia, and the United States have exploited these tensions to advance their interests, incentivizing both states to adopt zero-sum strategies.

The Way Forward

For genuine stability, both capitals must clarify their red lines and establish mechanisms to enforce them. Confidence-building measures such as joint border management, coordinated counterterrorism operations, and a mutually agreed refugee policy can reduce friction. Third-party mediation backed by credible guarantees might help, but only if both sides commit to ending the use of proxies.

Domestic reform is equally important. Pakistan needs to reduce its reliance on non-state actors and build stronger political and economic tools to influence Kabul. Afghanistan must improve its governance and ensure that its territory is not used to destabilize neighbors. The use of traditional Jirga system can also be an effective way forward for resolving all outstanding unresolved issues including the durandline.

Conclusion

The history of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations is a story of contradictions—between ideals and interests, between Islam and realpolitik, and between security and sovereignty. These contradictions are not mere mistakes but deliberate choices shaped by fear and power competition. Exposing them is the first step toward correcting them.

If both states continue to justify deception and coercion as normal practice, they will remain trapped in a cycle of mistrust and insecurity. Real stability will come only when Pakistan and Afghanistan align their policies not merely with national interests but with the ethical principles their societies profess to uphold—justice, honesty, and fairness. Only then can they move from a relationship of rivalry to one of responsible coexistence.

References

1. Ahmed, Akbar S. Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia. Oxford University Press, 1986.
2. Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. Penguin Press, 2004.
3. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Viking, 2008.
4. Riedel, Bruce. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad. Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
5. Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System. Yale University Press, 2002.
6. Saikal, Amin. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. I.B. Tauris, 2004.
7. International Crisis Group (ICG). Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA. Asia Report No. 178, 21 October 2009.
8. Human Rights Watch. Pakistan: Mass Forced Returns of Afghan Refugees. 2023.
9. Fair, C. Christine. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. Oxford University Press, 2014.
10. Yusuf, Moeed. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia. Stanford University Press, 2018.
11. Gall, Carlotta. The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001–2014. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014.
12. Khan, Feroz Hassan. Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press, 2012.
13. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Afghanistan Situation Report 2024.
14. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. Oxford University Press, 2008.
15. Haqqani, Husain. Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding. PublicAffairs, 2013.
16. Quran, Surah Al-Ma’idah 5:8; Surah An-Nahl 16:105; translated meanings emphasizing justice and truthfulness.