Pakistan’s evolving policy toward the Afghan Taliban: balancing security, diplomacy and sovereignty

Key Points  

1. The historical source of mistrust between both Pakistan and Afghanistanis Durand line (border) dispute. 
2. Pakistan changed its policy from cautious engagement to a mix of deterrence and diplomacy after TTP attacks from Afghan territory happenedagain and again. 
3. Islamabad would not want to engage in open confrontation; instead it would want a more diplomatic approach that incorporates deterrence and dialogue to maintain regional peace.  
4. Pakistan perceives the increasing trend of India in Afghanistan as an effort to instigate instability in its western border and destabilize the regional security.
5. The diplomatic dialogue is ongoing with the mediation ofTurkey and Qatar negotiations to control tension and deterioration. 
6. Pakistan wants to offset military coercion with diplomaticcollaborations by conditionalizing the counter-terrorist undertakings of Kabul with Afghanistan under regionally based trade and connectivity projects like CPEC and Gwadar Port access. 

Since 2021, Pakistan had been hoping that the Taliban would stabilize Afghanistan by returning to power in Kabul and ensure that cross-border militancy that is spilling to Pakistan reduces. Repeated high-profile assaults (senior police and military officers) within Pakistan (Balochistan and KPK) by 2025 as a result of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other forces based on Afghan territory made Islamabad conscious of the fact that engagement did no longer suffice to counter the threat; and the understanding compelled Pakistan to expand its repertoires of denying the threat to include visible security operations. 

Cases of gunfire exchange in October 2025, temporary closing of major crossings and retaliation efforts are all indicative of the speed with which security measures escalate when Islamabad feels that its sovereignty or internal security is at stake. The outcome of encouraging ceasefire agreements and the continuation of subsequent ceasefire agreements in Istanbul in late October 2025 are indicative of Islamabad preference to concurrently incorporate coercive strategies and diplomatic action. 

Past grievances, such as Durand Line sensitivities, non-recognition of that boundary by Afghanistan in some quarters and the porous nature of the terrain, hinder the straightforward application of prevailing principles of sovereignty; therefore, Pakistan incorporates legal-diplomatic messages, limits border crossings, depending on security requirements and seeks assistance on operations to operationalize surveillance systems by regional partners. The spillover effects of the Afghan war became dismal in Pakistan especially after the formation of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007, which worsened the security situation in the country. Despite the TTP formally declaring its support to the Afghan Taliban and its supreme leader, Pakistan still had an ongoing interaction with the Taliban in Afghanistan so that it would promote stability in the region, ensure that peace is restored in Afghanistan and also have an influence on the TTP as it would be through the Afghan Taliban. 

Empirical evidence Pakistani investigations and analysts report with references to the statements of captured militants, traces of transactions with financial sources and administrations reports indicate that external forces based in Afghanistan, some of which are reportedly linked to the Indian interests, facilitated TTP activities that caused the deaths of cross-border firing and casualties. 

Kabul River is one of the most important elements of the Pakistani irrigation system. Any obstruction to the river flow into Pakistan would involve immense problems to a country that is in dire short of water. The Afghani government has shown concerns about the use of the river resources by Pakistan. To achieve the best exploitation, Afghanistan is currently constructing dams on the river which is aided by India. It is estimated that the application of these projects will cut down the share of Pakistan by about 16-17%. Without a water-sharing agreement between two states, the matter will be a significant point of conflict that India will capitalize on.  

We need to understand the internal dynamics among various factions within the Afghan Taliban in order to grasp why the Taliban are reluctant to take decisive action against the sanctuaries of the Pakistani Taliban on their soil. During the 20-year war against foreign forces (US and Soviet), the Taliban were deeply focused on defending their sovereignty and adopted a coercive ideology in response to any external attack. After coming to power in August 2021, it has been difficult for them to abandon this hard, coercive approach in diplomacy.   

At the same time, Afghanistan is maintaining international diplomacy while holding on to its hard-core ideological stance. This two-sidedness highlights the effort of the Taliban to both gain the international legitimacy and maintain its domestic doctrinal beliefs. However, such a fragile balance often creates discrepancy in their foreign policy. In the case of Pakistan, it would be essential to identify this blend of pragmatism and rigidity to develop effective engagement strategies with the Kabul. 

The Afghan Taliban developed a deeply entrenched, hard-line ideology and has motivated local populations including jihadists based in Pakistan — to wage jihad against the United States. For this reason, Pakistan and Afghanistan should coordinate closely; a unified approach would undermine the adversary’s objectives. Pakistan ought to cultivate a mutually interdependent relationship with Afghanistan. Contemporary terrorism in Pakistan manifests as asymmetrical warfare, making it difficult to address through purely military measures. 

However, Pakistan should not lose hope. We share a long history of strategic relations with this group in Afghanistan. Diplomacy still has an important role to play in bringing the Afghan Taliban into closer and more coordinated cooperation with Pakistan to collectively address the menace of terrorism within Pakistan. 

Way Forward: 

To achieve a true stability, the heads of both states need to explain their red lines and put in place mechanisms to implement them. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan should recognize that India seeks to create strategic space in Afghanistan to fuel insurgency in Balochistan. This approach forms a core component of India’s foreign policy aimed at destabilizing Pakistan. India has exploited this region many times to expand its influence and weaken regional stability especially in Pakistan.  

The prevailing perception among ordinary Afghans and Indians of being adversaries serves as a strategic advantage to Pakistan, as it limits India’s influence in Afghanistan and counters attempts to encircle Pakistan. Through responsible media engagement, public awareness can be raised regarding these regional dynamics. 

Both countries must engage in direct dialogue to resolve their differences and establish mechanisms for mutual security cooperation. Given the shared cultural heritage, historical ties, and common heroes, Pakistan and Afghanistan have every reason to build a relationship rooted in trust, understanding, and regional stability. The security environment, terrorism, the waning economic condition, and climate change are some of the major threats that both the countries face and they require a coordinated mechanism and a harmonized operation. 

Pakistan should actively include Afghanistan as a key partner in regional connectivity initiatives and offer it special economic incentives. By granting Afghanistan access to projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port, Islamabad can strengthen mutual economic interdependence and build lasting goodwill. Such cooperation would help Kabul see greater benefit in maintaining stable and friendly relations with Pakistan, while at the same time reducing opportunities for India or militant groups like the TTP to exploit Afghan territory to undermine regional peace or disrupt trade and development efforts. 

References  

1. Hussain, Abid. Pakistan, Afghanistan to resume talks amid tensions over border clashes. AL JAZEERA, 
2. Moman, Abdullah. Pakistan hopes for positive outcome of next round of talks with Kabul. 

     Dawn 2025 

3. The Guardian. Heavy clashes erupt along Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 2025 

4. News Desk. CPEC to be expanded to Afghanistan. 2025 

5. UN report-The news. Afghan Taliban continues to provide logistical, financial support to TTP. 2025 

6. The Express Tribune. Afghan footprint deepens in Pakistan TTP attacks. 2025 

7. DAWN. India funding TTP through Afghan proxies, says envoy. 2024 

8. Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), the emerging role of India in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s concerns and policy response. 2023 

9. Baqir Sajjad, Syed. Specific Proof of Indian Terrorism in Pakistan unveiled. DAWN, 2020