Welfare chauvinism has been institutionalized as a policy in various ways by the Far-Right parties in France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary, and Poland. From angry opposition rhetoric to a gradual shift towards actual governing programmes based on deliberate exclusion of migrants from social benefits.
Key Points
- The Rassemblement National in France has shed its overtly racist image and replaced it with a legally framed welfare chauvinist agenda, winning growing support among working-class communities in France’s deindustrialised heartlands.
- The PVV in the Netherlands blends anti-Islamic cultural politics with a selective defence of Dutch welfare entitlements, though its ambitions in government have repeatedly run into the resistance of more economically liberal coalition partners.
- The Sweden Democrats have carried welfare chauvinism from the neo-Nazi fringe all the way into the Swedish political mainstream, reshaping asylum and integration policy without ever needing to hold a ministerial post.
- In Hungary and Poland, Fidesz and Law and Justice went further than anyone; turning welfare chauvinism into a full governing programme, pairing generous family benefits for native citizens with tightened immigration controls and the systematic weakening of democratic institutions.
- Taken together, these cases show that welfare chauvinism is not simply a protest politics; it is a model of governance that has proven it can win elections and reshape states.
Introduction
Welfare chauvinism, in the abstract, is a pretty straightforward political slogan — social benefits for the native citizens rather than immigrants. However, when examined at a national level across Europe, the situation is far from straightforward and fascinating. This politics has been elaborated in very different ways in the various member states, according to their respective histories, institutional frameworks, electoral bases, and power ties. This article examines in detail four instances: France, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Central and Eastern European bloc of Hungary and Poland to illustrate the entire spectrum of the politics of welfare chauvinism, from rhetoric in opposition to entrenched governing programmes.
France: The Rassemblement National and the Defence of the French Social Model
Probably the most-studied case of welfare chauvinism in Western Europe is the Rassemblement National, formerly known as the Front National until 2003. The party underwent deliberate and sustained transformation, or “dediabolisation”, under Marine Le Pen, as it consciously moved away from the blatant anti-Semitism and racism of early years and constructed a more respectable, policy-oriented welfare chauvinist program. Today, the RN’s image is that of a force that is not exclusionary but rather a bastion of the French social model, a force that stands in opposition to both immigration and the economic liberalisation of the EU. This has generally translated into a campaign against pension reform. A commitment to providing purchasing power to ordinary workers, and a vigorous advocacy of the principle of ‘’priorité nationale’’, which puts French nationals ahead of EU and non-EU migrants in the line for social housing, public employment, and welfare benefits. This is welfare chauvinism, and it has succeeded. The RN has made steady and substantial gains in the poorly paid industrial towns of north-eastern France, where workers have traditionally voted strongly for the left.
There is a significant internal conflict in the party’s political economy. Its economic plan includes protectionist and state-interventionist policies, while also opposing EU market integration. However, Marine Le Pen’s presidential campaign in 2022 had proposed measures including reducing the retirement age. This, however, suspected a significant rise in public spending without a viable financial source. The contradictions arise from the challenge of building a cross-class coalition on a welfare chauvinist platform. Whose appeal must not only be to the economic interests of the working class, but also to petit-bourgeois supporters who are hostile to high levels of public spending.
The Netherlands: Partij voor de Vrijheid
A slightly different version of far-right welfare politics is given by Geert Wilders’s Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV). The party’s cultural nationalism is very much oriented towards Islam. Its economic populism, shifting between market liberalism and welfare statism, is selective.
In recent years – and especially since the PVV historic win in November 2023 general elections – Wilders has focused on safeguarding social security for Dutch native citizens, rather than it migrants and asylum seekers. His political economy is less programmatic than the RN. It is partly due to the PVV’s peculiar organisational structure (it has no formal membership, and operates as a Wilders’ personal agenda platform). But the welfare chauvinist line (Dutch benefits for the Dutch) runs through it as a rhetorical and programmatic thread.
As the PVV has been in government since 2023, in a coalition led by Prime Minister Dick Schoof, these pledges have been put to the test. The party’s ability to translate welfare chauvinist demands into policy has been limited by its coalition partners. They are more orthodox in their liberal-economic views, which is why PVV made significant programmatic compromises during coalition negotiations.
Sweden: The Transition of Social Democrats
The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) have their roots in the neo-Nazi movements. However, they have undergone a long process of normalisation that has brought them to a prominent place in Swedish politics. Their welfare politics provide a snapshot of the march of welfare chauvinism from the fringes to mainstream politics.
The SD has always maintained strong support for a welfare Swedish state. Indeed, it is one of the most generous in the world, needs to be robust, and sustaining such a strong welfare state depends on restricting immigrants. From their perspective, generosity in welfare and restriction in immigration combined is the only way for Sweden to continue being a welfare state. They believe that to maintain a generous welfare state, one must restrict who benefits from it. However, such arguments are persuasive for many in the Swedish electorate, including the majority of former Social Democratic voters.
Since 2022, the SD has had a considerable impact on Swedish migration and integration policy, leading to a hardening of policies regarding asylum and family reunification. For a long time, the welfare chauvinist logic has been partially institutionalized. Although SD might have no direct power, however, it indirectly influences policy formulation with backing from other like-minded political parties in the parliament.
Hungary and Poland: The Rise of Welfare Chauvinism to Power
Central and Eastern Europe is the most sophisticated region in the EU in terms of far-right welfare politics. The extreme right-wing parties Fidesz (Hungary) and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland found themselves in full control of their governments for an extended period. Therefore, they were able to enact their policies with relatively few institutional hurdles.
Both parties in their respective countries enacted extensive family and natalist (pro-birth) welfare payments. While restricting immigration, undermining civil society, and judicial independence. The PiS government’s policy of increasing social provision, especially for children through the 500+ child benefit programme (500 złoty per month per child) was one of the most important expansions in post-communist Polish history. It was explicitly presented as a policy designed to preserve the Polish family from demographic decline and migrant replacement. PiS returned to power in 2019 with an even higher percentage of the vote, a political triumph.
It shows that welfare chauvinism is not just an oppositional politics; it can also be a governing programme, that can provide tangible material benefits to targeted groups. However, it also creates an authoritarian institutional framework that consolidates the ruling party’s power.
Conclusion
Taken together, the comparative evidence shows that welfare chauvinism is neither a passing phase nor a single phenomenon. It takes different shapes in different places — sometimes a legal aspiration, sometimes a rhetorical frame, sometimes a fully institutionalised system of exclusion. But across all these cases, the underlying logic is the same: the welfare state is recast as a national possession, something to be protected for those who truly belong, and denied to those who do not. What is also clear is that this politics has real limits — coalition partners push back, fiscal promises outrun revenue, and the gap between rhetoric and delivery can become a political liability. Understanding both the appeal and the contradictions of welfare chauvinism is essential for anyone trying to think seriously about what comes next for European social democracy.
* Dr. Haris Hassan is a public policy scholar, researcher and lecturer. He completed his PhD at Charles University, Prague, where he is teaching public and social policy. His expertise spans Public Governance, Development Economics, and the Political Economy of Colonial Institutions, with publications in leading international peer-reviewed journals.
References
Bohle, D., & Greskovits, B. (2019). Politicising embedded neoliberalism: Continuity and change in Hungary’s development model. West European Politics, 42(5), 1069–1093.
Careja, R., Elmelund-Præstekær, C., Baggesen Klitgaard, M., & Larsen, E. G. (2016). Direct and indirect welfare chauvinism as party strategies: An analysis of the Danish People’s Party. Scandinavian Political Studies, 39(4), 282–304.
de Koster, W., Achterberg, P., & van der Waal, J. (2013). The new right and the welfare state: The electoral relevance of welfare chauvinism and welfare populism in the Netherlands. International Political Science Review, 34(1), 3–20.
Grzebalska, W., & Pető, A. (2018). The gendered modus operandi of the illiberal transformation in Hungary and Poland. Women’s Studies International Forum, 68, 164–172.
Ivarsflaten, E. (2008). What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases. Comparative Political Studies, 41(1), 3–23.
Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe (Vol. 22). Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Studying populism in comparative perspective: Reflections on the contemporary and future research agenda. Comparative Political Studies, 51(13), 1667–1693.
Norocel, O. C. (2017). Populist radical right protectors of the folkhem: Welfare chauvinism in Sweden. Critical Social Policy, 37(3), 371–390.
Schumacher, G., & Van Kersbergen, K. (2016). Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of populist parties? Party Politics, 22(3), 300–312.
Stockemer, D. (2017). The Front National in France: Continuity and change under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen. Springer.
Van der Waal, J., de Koster, W., & van Oorschot, W. (2013). Three worlds of welfare chauvinism? How welfare regimes affect support for distributing welfare to immigrants in Europe. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 15(2), 164–181.
Vossen, K. (2017). The power of populism: Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands. Routledge.