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Conflicts between states are often explained through external determinants such as power politics, alliances, and geopolitics. Yet, an equally critical dimension lies within the internal determinants that shape a state’s behavior and drive it toward confrontation. These include political leadership, ideology, domestic legitimacy, economic pressures, institutional interests, and public opinion. The Russia–Ukraine and India–Pakistan conflicts demonstrate how domestic imperatives often push states into external wars that mirror internal struggles for identity, stability, and authority.

Since 2021, Pakistan had been hoping that the Taliban would stabilize Afghanistan by returning to power in Kabul and ensure that cross-border militancy that is spilling to Pakistan reduces. Repeated high-profile assaults (senior police and military officers) within Pakistan (Balochistan and KPK) by 2025 as a result of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other forces based on Afghan territory made Islamabad conscious of the fact that engagement did no longer suffice to counter the threat; and the understanding compelled Pakistan to expand its repertoires of denying the threat to include visible security operations.

Pakistan and Afghanistan share a border, a people, and a century of tangled politics. Their relationship has been shaped by colonial legacies, competing security priorities, and chronic mistrust. Both states claim victimhood while pursuing policies that often reproduce the very instability they denounce. This article outlines those contradictions with evidence and offers an honest appraisal of why the cycle persists.

The Deobandi school of Islam, born in nineteenth century British India, has long been more than a religious movement. It represents a deeply entrenched social and ideological network that has shaped politics across South Asia. In Pakistan, Deobandi thought became an instrument of state strategy, particularly during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and later through support for the Afghan Taliban. The state saw in the Deobandi ideology both moral legitimacy and mobilization potential for its regional ambitions. Yet, in recent years, Pakistan’s narrative toward sections of the Deobandi movement has shifted from cooperation to confrontation. By labeling certain Deobandi jihadists as “Khawarij” or “Indian proxies,” the state has crossed an ideological boundary that once sustained its strategic depth. This shift risks alienating the Deobandi constituency, undermining religious legitimacy, and perpetuating instability.

The Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, has dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and beyond. While the attack was initially seen through the lens of brutality, loss of life, and the ensuing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, its long-term strategic consequences are gradually becoming more visible. In retrospect, this event could be understood not merely as an outbreak of violence but as a turning point in the regional and international order, undermining frameworks such as the Abraham Accords, elevating Palestinian statehood on the global agenda, weakening Israel’s external interdependence, and signaling the gradual decline of U.S. hegemony.

The brief but intense armed conflict between India and Pakistan in May 2025, precipitated by the horrific Pahalgam terrorist attack in Kashmir on April 22 that killed 26 civilians (BBC 2025), represents a critical juncture in the strategic trajectories of both South Asian rivals. Ostensibly concluding with a fragile ceasefire on May 10 (UN News 2025), the conflict and its diplomatic aftermath reveal a complex interplay of military assertions, economic pressures, and geopolitical maneuvering that fundamentally challenges the official narratives of victory promoted by both nations. The subsequent months have witnessed Pakistan celebrating diplomatic and economic gains through a renewed partnership with the United States, including a trade deal lowering tariffs to 19% (USTR 2025) and an agreement on oil development (White House 2025), while India faces punitive U.S. tariffs of 25% alongside penalties for its Russian energy and defense purchases (U.S. Treasury 2025). This divergence prompts a deeper examination of whether India has compromised its cherished strategic autonomy and whether Pakistan’s apparent successes constitute sustainable strategic gains or merely tactical concessions with hidden long-term costs.

When we study international relations, it becomes clear that personality can shape foreign policy in profound ways. Donald J Trump is a prime example of this phenomenon. His second term in the White House has once again demonstrated how his personal traits, especially his constant need for recognition, are tightly bound to his foreign policy actions. For Trump symbolic prizes and public validation are not peripheral but central to his sense of success. The Nobel Peace Prize has been a recurring theme in his rhetoric, and his actions abroad reflect a continuing pursuit of dramatic gestures that would elevate him into history. From a psychological standpoint this is consistent with leaders who display high narcissism, high extraversion, and low agreeableness. They crave attention, are extremely sensitive to perceived slights, and sometimes take risks that others would avoid.