In contemporary times of instability, as Iran, Israel and the United States became embroiled in a major regional conflict, Islamabad began opening a new chapter in Middle Eastern politics. The deepening of the Saudi-Pakistan defence partnership has repositioned Pakistan from a peripheral South Asian state into an emerging actor and potential net security provider in Middle Eastern affairs.
A dehumanising statement was made by India’s Chief Justice that compared unemployed youth to “cockroaches” in May 2026, leading to the rapid growth of the satirical Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), which grew to 20 million or more followers and organised nationwide protests. But instead of turning violent and radicalising, the movement’s complaints were redirected into non-violent, humorous civic activity that led to the resignation of a minister.
Pakistan Faces combined threats of multiple nature including insurgency, cyber security, political disinformation, political instability and economic instability.
Pakistan and India share the same rivers and monsoons, but Pakistan lacks the water storage capacity coming from India and the treaty that gave it stability has broken down.
The US-Israel war on Iran, now is in the fifth month; this conflict has reshaped the Middle Eastern Geopolitics and deep economic and security vulnerabilities for the states like Pakistan.
Cyber threats lie under the umbrella of hybrid warfare. On top of a domestic security record that has already failed; the rapidly expanding CPEC and other digital infrastructure (foreign-built,
Welfare chauvinism has been institutionalized as a policy in various ways by the Far-Right parties in France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary, and Poland. From angry opposition rhetoric to a gradual shift towards actual governing programmes based on deliberate exclusion of migrants from social benefits.
Once opposed to the idea of welfare, they have over the decades transformed into defenders of the welfare state — the Far-Rights. However, their political manifestation stresses restricting welfare benefits to native citizens, exploiting Neoliberal dislocation and migration anxieties to build working-class electoral coalitions.
Zorain Nizamani’s “It is Over” captures the growing frustration of the young generation toward a seemingly unresponsive and outdated political and institutional order. His argument resonates with many: there is a disconnect between the youth’s aspirations and the establishment’s inertia. However, the claim that the generational contract is broken beyond repair may be premature. It’s not over yet. Beneath the noise of cynicism and disillusionment lies an undercurrent of transformation, collaboration, and constructive activism redefining civic engagement in the 21st century.
Over the last six months Afghanistan diplomacy has evolved into a pattern of steady engagement marked by frequent meetings targeted outreach and a deliberate effort to appear as a functioning and predictable state actor. Rather than dramatic diplomatic announcements the period has been defined by continuous contact with regional and international actors as reflected in official meetings hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul and through sustained telephonic diplomacy. These engagements together provide a clearer picture of where Afghanistan foreign relations are heading and what limits continue to shape them.
